Equilibrium transitions in finite populations of players by Miekisz, Jacek
ar
X
iv
:q
-b
io
/0
41
20
38
v1
  [
q-
bio
.PE
]  
20
 D
ec
 20
04
Equilibrium transitions in finite populations of players
Jacek Mie¸kisz
Institute of Applied Mathematics
and Mechanics
Warsaw University
ul. Banacha 2
02-097 Warsaw, Poland
October 25, 2018
Abstract. We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing games.
We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems
on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of two-player games with two symmet-
ric Nash equilibria, when the number of players increases, the population undergoes multiple
transitions between its equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting in-
dividuals; see for example Santa Fe collection of papers on economic complex systems [1],
econophysics bulletin [2], and statistical mechanics and quantitative biology archives [3].
Here we will consider game-theoretic models of many interacting agents [4, 5, 6]. In such
models, agents have at their disposal certain strategies and their payoffs in a game depend
on strategies chosen both by them and by their opponents. A configuration of a system,
that is an assignment of strategies to agents, is a Nash equilibrium if for any agent, for fixed
strategies of his opponents, changing the current strategy will not increase his payoff. One of the
fundamental problems in game theory is the equilibrium selection in games with multiple Nash
equilibria. In two-player games with two strategies we may have two Nash equilibria: a payoff
dominant (also called efficient) and a risk-dominant one. In the efficient equilibrium, players
receive highest possible payoffs. The strategy is risk-dominant if it has a higher expected payoff
against a player playing both strategies with equal probabilities. It is played by individuals
averse to risks.
One of the selection methods is to construct a dynamical system where in the long run only
one equilibrium is played with a high frequency. Here we will discuss an adaptive dynamics
introduced by Robson and Vega-Redondo [7]. In their model, at any time period, individuals
play only one game with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against an average
strategy as in the replicator dynamics or the adaptive model of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob
[8]). The selection part of the dynamics ensures that if the mean payoff of a given strategy at
the time t is bigger than the mean payoff of the other one, then the number of individuals playing
the given strategy should increase in t + 1. In addition, with a small probability representing
the noise of the system, players may make mistakes.
To describe the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics, Foster and Young [9] introduced
a concept of stochastic stability. A state of a system (a number of individuals playing the first
strategy in our models) is stochastically stable if it has a positive probability in the stationary
state in the limit of zero noise. It means that in the long run we observe it with a positive
frequency.
Here we review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of the
above desribed dynamics on the number of players and the noise level. We will combine these
results to show that in the case of two-player games with two symmetric Nash equilibria, when
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the number of players increases, the population undergoes multiple transitions between its
equilibria.
2 Adaptive dynamics with mistakes
We will consider a finite population of n individuals who have at their disposal one of two
strategies: A and B. At every discrete moment of time, t = 1, 2, ..., they are randomly paired
(we assume that n is even) to play a two-player symmetric game with payoffs given by the
following matrix:
A B
A a b
U =
B c d
where the ij entry, i, j = A,B, is the payoff of the first (row) player when he plays the
strategy i and the second (column) player plays the strategy j. We assume that both players
are the same and hence payoffs of the column player are given by the matrix transposed to U ;
such games are called symmetric.
An assignment of strategies to both players is a Nash equilibrium, if for each player, for a
fixed strategy of his opponent, changing the current strategy will not increase his payoff. If
a > c and d > b, then (A,A) and (B,B) are two Nash equilibria. If a + b < c + d, then the
strategy B has a higher expected payoff against a player playing both strategies with equal
probabilities. We say that B risk dominates the strategy A (the notion of the risk-dominance
was introduced and thoroughly studied by Harsa´nyi and Selten [10]). If in addition a > d,
then we have a selection problem of choosing between the payoff-dominant (also caled efficient)
equilibrium (A,A) and the risk-dominant (B,B).
At every discrete moment of time t, the state of our population is described by the number
of individuals, zt, playing A. Formally, by the state space we mean the set
Ω = {z, 0 ≤ z ≤ n}.
Now we describe the dynamics of our system. It consists of two components: selection and
mutation. The selection mechanism ensures that if the mean payoff of a given strategy,
πi(zt), i = A,B, at the time t is bigger than the mean payoff of the other one, then the
number of individuals playing the given strategy should increase in t+ 1.
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Let pt denote the random variable which describes the number of cross-pairings, i.e. the
number of pairs of matched individuals playing different strategies at the time t. Let us notice
that pt depends on zt. For a given realization of pt and zt, mean payoffs obtained by each
strategy are as follows:
πA(zt, pt) =
a(zt − pt) + bpt
zt
, (1)
πB(zt, pt) =
cpt + d(n− zt − pt)
n− zt
,
provided 0 < zt < n.
We assume that at any time period, each individual has a revision opportunity with a small
positive probability τ and adopts a strategy with the higher mean payoff. Players may make
mistakes. At every time period, each player who has a revision opportunity, instead of following
the selection rule may adopt the other strategy with a small probability ǫ. It is easy to see, that
for any two states of the population, there is a positive probability of the transition between
them in some finite number of time steps. We have therefore obtained an irreducible Markov
chain with n + 1 states. It has a unique stationary state (a probability mass function) which
we denote by µǫn. For any z ∈ Ω, µ
ǫ
n(z) is the frequency of visiting the state z in the long run.
The following definition was introduced by Foster and Young [9].
Definition z ∈ Ω is stochastically stable if limǫ→0 µ
ǫ
n(z) > 0.
3 Equilibrium transitions
We review here recent results concerning the dependence of stochastic stability of equilibria on
the number of players.
They are based on a certain tree representation of stationary states of irreducible Markov
chains ([11, 12, 13]; see also Appendix). We assume that at any time period, each individual
has a revision opportunity with a small positive probability τ . It follows that z = 0 and z = n
are the only absorbing states. After a finite number of steps of the noise-free dynamics, we
arrive at one of these two states and stay there forever - there are no other recurrence classes.
Therefore to obtain a stationary state in the limit of zero noise, it is enough to count a number
of mistakes the population needs to evolve between these states. If one requires, for example,
fewer mistakes to evolve from z = 0 to z = n than from z = n to z = 0, then z = n is
stochastically stable.
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Robson and Vega-Redondo proved that for a sufficiently big number of players, the efficient
strategy A is stochastically stable [7]. They showed that limǫ→0 µ
ǫ
n(n) = 1 which means that
in the long run, in the limit of no mistakes, all individuals play A.
However, their proof requires the number of players to be sufficiently big. It was showed in
[14] that the risk-dominant strategy B is stochastically stable if the number of players is below
(2a− c− b)/(a− c).
Let us recall the proof. If the population consists of only one B-player and n− 1 A-players
and if c > [a(n− 2) + b]/(n− 1), that is n < (2a− c− b)/(a− c), then πB > πA. It means that
one needs only one mistake to evolve from z = n to z = 0. It is easy to see that two mistakes
are necessary to evolve from z = 0 to z = n which finishes the proof.
To see stochastically stable states, we need to take the limit of the zero noise level. It was
showed in [14] that for any arbitrarily low fixed noise level, if the number of players is big
enough, then in the long run only a small fraction of the population plays the efficient strategy
A. Smaller the noise level is, fewer individuals play A.
Let us note that the above theorem concerns an ensemble of states, not an individual one.
In the limit of the infinite number of players, that is the infinite number of states of the system,
every single state has zero probability in the stationary state. It is an ensemble of states that
might be stable. Ensemble and stochastic stability in spatial games with local interactions were
recently discussed in [15, 16, 17]. For an interesting discussion on the importance of the order
of taking different limits (τ → 0, n→∞, and ǫ→ 0) in evolutionary models (especially in the
Aspiration and Imitation model) see [18].
Now we combine the above theorems and obtain
Theorem
For any δ > 0 and β > 0 there exist ǫ(δ, β) and n1 < n2 < n3(ǫ) < n4(ǫ) such that
if n < n1 =
2a−c−b
a−c
, then µǫn(z = 0) > 1− δ,
if n2 < n < n3(ǫ), then µ
ǫ
n(z = n) > 1− δ,
if n > n4(ǫ), then µ
ǫ
n(z ≤ βn) > 1− δ for a sufficiently small τ .
We see that for a fixed noise level, when the number of player increases, the population
undergoes twice a transition between its two equilibria. Of course, for any fixed number of
players, n > n2, if the noise level is sufficiently small, then almost all indivisuals will play in
the long run the efficient strategy A.
In order to study the long-run behavior of stochastic population dynamics, we should esti-
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mate the relevant parameters to be sure what limiting procedures are appropriate in specific
examples. Equilibrium transitions in other stochastic dynamics of finite populations were re-
cently investigated in [19, 20].
Appendix
The following tree representation of stationary distributions of Markov chains was proposed
by Freidlin and Wentzell [11, 12], see also [13]. Let (Ω, P ) be an irreducible Markov chain
with a state space Ω and transition probabilities given by P ǫ : Ω× Ω→ [0, 1]. It has a unique
stationary distribution, µǫ, also called a stationary state. For X ∈ Ω, let an X-tree be a directed
graph on Ω such that from every Y 6= X there is a unique path to X and there are no outcoming
edges out of X . Denote by T (X) the set of all X-trees and let
qǫ(X) =
∑
d∈T (X)
∏
(Y,Y ′)∈d
P ǫ(Y, Y ′), (2)
where the product is with respect to all edges of d. We have that
µǫ(X) =
qǫ(X)
∑
Y ∈Ω qǫ(Y )
(3)
for all X ∈ Ω.
Let us assume now that after a finite number of steps of the noise-free dynamics, i.e. ǫ = 0,
we arrive at one of two absorbing states, say X and Y , and stay there forever - there are
no other recurrence classes. It follows from the tree representation that any state different
from absorbing states has zero probability in the stationary distribution in the zero-noise limit.
Consider a dynamics in which P ǫ(Z,W ) for all Z,W ∈ Ω, is of order ǫm, where m is the number
of mistakes involved to pass from Z to W or is zero. Then one has to compute the minimal
number of mistakes, mXY , needed to make a transition from the state X to Y and the number
of mistakes, mY X , to evolve from Y to X . q(X) is of order ǫ
m(Y X) and q(Y ) is of order ǫm(XY ).
It follows that if mXY < mY X , then Y is stochastically stable and moreover limǫ→0 µ
ǫ(Y ) = 1.
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